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RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY: A MODEL
GUEST WORKER STATUTE

The presence of large numbers of illegal aliens working in the United
States has created several problems. Illegal aliens symbolize the inability
of the United States to control its borders and care for its citizens.
Their illegal presence indicates a willingness to violate United States
laws. Apart from these symbolic problems, illegal aliens may create
economic harms. Their fear of apprehension and deportation makes
them susceptible to exploitation by employers, leading to lessened enforcement of United States wage, health, and safety legislation, as well
as to depressed wages and working conditions. The presence of illegal
aliens also increases population pressures on natural resources.
Several solutions have been proposed to the problem of the presence
of large numbers of illegal aliens. 1 A program for admission of temporary workers provides one potential solution. Although there are
several proposals for modification of the existing temporary worker
program, and for creation of a new, larger temporary worker program, 2
these proposals have not met with universal approval. Some groups,
for example, have called for the revision or elimination of the existing
program, 3 arguing that the presence of foreign workers depresses wages
and working conditions for all workers.
l. For example, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill includes as solutions employer sanctions for the
hiring of illegal aliens, stricter border control, and amnesty for illegal aliens in the United States.
For descriptions of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, see The Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1983, 129 CoNG. REC. S6969 (May 18, 1983); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
97TH CONG., 2D SEss., IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL 7 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter
cited as SENATE STAFF REPORT); Simpson, The Immigration Reform and Control Act: Immigration Policy and the National Interest, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 147, 159 (1984); Note, The Simpson-

' Mazzoli Bill: Altering the Policy of Neglect of Undocumented Immigration from South of the
Border, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 347 (1983). Other proposed alternatives include forced repatriation,
open immigration, and development aid aimed at increasing job opportunities in rural regions
of sending countries.
2. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note l, at 19-20 (briefly reviewing recent administrations'
immigration reform proposals); see also H.R. 3961, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (proposing temporary worker program); H.R. 2984, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (removing adverse wage determination as requirement for admission of temporary agricultural workers); H.R. 4795, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981) (proposing Agricultural Guest Worker Act of 1981); H.R. 4021, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981) (proposing temporary worker program).
3. Migrant Legal Action Program, The "H-2 Program": Temporary Alien Workers in the
U.S. Agriculture, in SELECT CoMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, STAFF REPORT,
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This Note argues that a temporary foreign worker program is needed
to alleviate the effects of illegal immigration. Part I describes the problems that illegal aliens present and discusses the interests of the groups
affected by their presence in the United States. Part II discusses the
inability of forced repatriation, amnesty, closing the border, or employer
sanctions to satisfy these interests. Part II also discusses the undesirability of ignoring the problem of illegal aliens. Part III explains how a
program for admission of temporary foreign workers best meets the
interests of domestic employers, domestic and foreign workers, sending countries, and the United States as a society. Finally Part IV proposes a model statute for a temporary foreign worker program.
I.

ILLEGAL ALIEN WORKERS: PROBLEMS AND COMPETING INTERESTS

A.

Problems Created by the Presence of Illegal Aliens

Although it is impossible to determine exactly how many illegal aliens
are currently in the United States, 4 estimates range from two to twelve
million, 5 with general agreement that the actual figure falls between
four and six million. 6 Estimates of new entrants each year range from
100,000 to 1,200,000, with general agreement on approximately 600,000.'
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, app. F, at 17 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as STAFF REPORT].
4. Several problems exist with the various estimation methods. Corwin, The Numbers Game:
Estimates of Illegal Aliens in the United States, 1970-198/, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoss., Spring
1982, at 223 (describing problems with data on which estimates are based and assumptions underlying estimating methods; discussing political reasons for favoring higher or lower estimates); Sehgal
& Vialet, Documenting the Undocumented: Data, Like Aliens, are Elusive, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
Oct. 1980, at 18 (summarizing varying estimates resulting from six recent studies); Siegel, Passel
& Robinson, Preliminary Review of Existing Studies of the Number of Illegal Alien Residents
in the United States, in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. E, at 15 (distinguishing speculative
and empirically based estimation methods and assessing accuracy of the empirically based methods);
see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ILLEGAL AuENs: ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND 3
(prepared for the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.) (Comm. Print 1977)
(noting that the variation in Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates between 1 and
12 million "cast[s] some doubt on their credibility").
5. S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, THE ILLEGAL ALIEN FROM MEXICO: POLICY CHOICES FOR AN INTRACTABLE IssuE 12 (1980) (reporting estimates ranging ·from 2 to 12 million, or between 2 and
3 percent of the total United States population); Chapman, A Look at Illegal Immigration: Causes
and Impact on the United States, 13 SAN DIEoo L. REv. 34, 35 (1975) (reporting estimates from
4 to 12 million).
6. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION POLICY 385 (Staff Report 1979) [hereinafter
cited as INTERAGENCY TASK FoRcE]; Reubens, Immigration Problems, Limited- Visa Programs
and Other Options, in STAFF REPORT supra note 3, app. F, at 93; Siegel, Passel & Robinson,
supra note 4, at 33.
7. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 255 (noting that estimates of yearly entries
range from 250,000 to 1,000,000). Most observers agree that 100,000 to 500,000 new illegal aliens
remain in the United States each year. Martin, Regulating Alien Behavior in Industrial Societies,
in STAFF REPORT supra note 3, app. F, at 224.
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Most of these individuals become part of the work force, 8 but many
return home when no longer employed. 9
The presence of these large numbers of illegal aliens creates a variety
of problems. Symbolically, illegal immigration signals failure of the
government - as planners and enforcers - on a large scale. Such
a large population of illegal aliens suggests that the United States has
lost control of its borders. 10 It also signifies the vitiation of the United
States immigration policy. 11 The existence of a large group that enters
and exists outside the law reduces respect for the law. 12 Finally, popula8. Reubens, supra note. 6, at 135 (reporting that eighty percent of illegal aliens work); see
also INTERAGENCY-TASK FoRCE, supra note 6, at 148; Fogel, Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects
and Public Policy Alternatives, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63, 67 (1979); North & LaBel, Manpower
and Immigration Policies in the United States (National Commission for Manpower Policy Special
Report No. 20, 1978).
9. Workers have traditionally moved across the land now marked as the border between the
United States and Mexico. See Fogel, supra note 8, at 74-75; Scruggs, The US, Mexico, and
the Wetbacks, 1942-1947, reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON lHE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
SELECTED READINGS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND LAW 238, 239 (Comm. Print 1980). Many
Mexican families rely on income earned from work in the United States. Lopez, Undocumented
Mexican Immigration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV.
615, 685 (1981); Siegel, Passel & Robinson, supra note 4, at 28-29 (finding that three quarters
of the families in one village relied on United States earnings and two-thirds of these alien workers
were legal immigrants). Many illegal aliens intend to work only temporarily in the United States.
W. CORNELIUS, L. CHAVEZ & J. CASTRO, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: A
SUMMARY OF CuRRENT KNOWLEDGE 14-15 (1982); Bustamente & Martinez, Undocumented Immigration from Mexico: Beyond Borders but within Systems, 33 J. INT'L AFF. 265, 268 (1979);
Poitras, The U.S. Experience of Return Migrants from Costa Rica and El Salvador, in STAFF
REPORT, supra note 3, app. E, at 45, 89. Immigration and Naturalization Service enforcement
policies and ineligibility of illegal aliens for United States social service programs encourage Mexican
illegal aliens to return to Mexico when they are not employed. Martin, supra note 7, at 232
(possibility of apprehension encourages return in times of high United States unemployment);
see also North & LaBel, supra note 8.
10. The United States does not exercise its sovereign power of control of its borders when
it allows illegal entry. See Fallows, Immigration: How it's Affecting Us, An. MONTHLY, Nov.
1983, at 45, 48; Fogel, supra note 8, at 76. Foreign countries, taking advantage of this weakness,
may send their undesirable members to the United States. A recent example is Cuba's shipment
of prisoners and mental hospital patients to the United States in the 1980 Mariel Harbor boatlift. See, e.g., Orlow, America's Incoherent Immigration Policy: Some Problems and Solutions,
36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 931, 933 n.10 (1982).
11. The illegal entry of aliens defeats policy decisions about the allocation of visas to each
country, Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)§ 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1982), the types
of persons to be excluded, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 41, 60;-INA _§ 212, 8
U.S.C. § 1182, and the primacy of family reunification, Chiswick, Guidelines for the Reform
of Immigration Policy, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 893, 901-02 (1982); INA§§ 201(b), 203(a)(I), (2),
(3), (5), 8 U.S.C. §§ 115I(b), 1153(a)(I), (2), (3), (5); see also Goodpaster, I/legal Immigration,
1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 651,653 (1981) (noting that citizens, through the political process, or illegal
aliens can define the types of persons currently entering the United States and therefore the
future composition of the United States society).
12. See Lopez, supra note 9, at 707 (reporting loss of respect by Mexicans for United States
laws). One major violation, smuggling of aliens into the United States, constitutes a major problem for law enforcement agencies, and a danger to many aliens. See also Goodpaster, supra
note II, at 68 I.
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tion planning and resource allocation cannot occur when there is a
large but unidentifiable group of people in the United States. 13
In the short term, significant economic effects of illegal immigration must be considered. Although the effects of illegal immigration
cannot be proven conclusively, there are claims that these effects are
large and undesirable. Illegal aliens may impose burdens on United
States income transfer programs. 14 · More significantly, widespread

13. Regardless of the role the United States should play as a sovereign or as a haven for
disadvantaged people, the immigration policy must show some concern about the number of
people in the country. Population growth from legal and iilegal immigration imposes pressures
on natural resources and disparity in living conditions, leading to poverty and cultural conflict.
Goodpaster, supra note II, at 653; Comment, Employer Sanctions: The "New Solution" to
the Illegal Alien Problem, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 439.
14. Because illegal aliens are, by definition, outside the law, there is limited information from
which to draw conclusions on their use of, and contribution to, social services. Although it appears aliens are not responsible for large drains on social services, some aliens do receive services
to which they are not entitled or indirectly cause others to need such services. For some aliens,
the opposite problem occurs; they contribute to government coffers but are afraid to use the services.
Some scholars have found that illegal aliens directly and indirectly burden social service programs. Some studies report that illegal aliens impose costs greater than their contributions to
social service and income transfer programs. See, e.g., Chapman, A Look at Illegal Immigration: Causes and Impact on the United States, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 34, 35 (1975); Manulkin
& Maghame, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Undocumented Mexican Alien Workers,
13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42, 48 (1975). In addition, illegal aliens impose an indirect burden on
income transfer programs; domestic workers unemployed due to competition from illegal aliens
turn to income transfer programs. Lopez describes this belief as part of the "informed consensus" about illegal aliens, a consensus based on an inaccurate understanding of historical events
and present circumstances. Lopez, supra note 9, at 635.
Other researchers say these conclusions are incorrect. Illegal aliens are not eligible for most
social service and income transfer programs, including Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), Social Security Supplemental Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled (SSI), Food
Stamps, Medicaid and Unemployment Insurance. D. NORTH, ENFORCING THE IMMIGRATION LAw:
A REVIEW OF THE OPTIONS 73 (1980) [hereinafter cited as D. NORTH, REVIEW OF OPTIONS); Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 696. Legal obstacles and the fear of being caught and deported have
discouraged illegal aliens from trying to collect money from income transfer programs. For example, estimates of illegal aliens who have collected unemployment compensation range from
207o to 10% of illegal aliens. D. NORTH, IMMIGRATION AND INCOME TRANSFER POLICIES IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF A NoN-RELATIONSIIlP 37-38 (1980); Lopez, supra note 9, at 636.
Even when aliens contribute to social programs, they are unlikely to benefit. At least 55%
of illegal aliens have social security payments deducted from their wages, according to a summary of five studies. D. NORTH, supra, at 27. Illegal aliens contribute tax revenue through sales taxes
and property taxes through rent payments. Lopez, supra note 9, at 363. Still, few illegal aliens
receive benefits from their contributions. Social security payments to retirees in Mexico are lower
than payments to retirees in other countries. D. NORTH, THE BORDER CROSSERS; PEOPLE WHO
LIVE IN MEXICO AND WORK IN THE UNITED STATES (1970), reprinted in Migrant and Seasonal

Farmworker Powerlessness: Hearings on Border Commuter Labor Problem Before the Subcomm.
on Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., !st Sess.
2194, 2395-96 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NORTH, BORDER CROSSERS). Illegal aliens make limited
use of medical care and job training programs. North & Houstoun, The Characteristics and
Role of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market: An Exploratory Study, summarized in STAFF
REPORT, supra note 3, at 226; see also COMMUNITY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: THEIR IMPACT ON THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (1980); D. NORTH, GOVERNMENT RECORDS:
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employment-oriented illegal immigration threatens exploitation by
employers. 15 A continuing debate addresses the effect of illegal aliens
upon the economy. Many analysts believe that alien labor "replaces"
American labor in two ways. First, undocumented workers replace
domestic workers directly. Because employers can pay lower wages or
withhold contributions to social security and unemployment compensation, they may prefer to hire undocumented workers. 16 Second, there
may be an indirect, and perhaps more widespread, replacement effect.
This indirect replacement occurs because the presence of illegal aliens
retards improvements in wages and working conditions that would attract domestic workers. 11 Some experts disagree with the notion of a
WHAT THEY TELL Us ABOUT THE ROLE OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS IN THE LABOR MARKET AND IN
INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS (1981).
On balance, their contributions to such systems may outweigh costs that they impose on social
service and income transfer programs. STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 526; S. WEINTRAUB &
S. Ross, supra note 5, at 24-25.
15. Employers often exploit illegal workers by intentionally refusing to abide by protective
legislation. Chapman, supra note 5, at 40; Developments in the Law - Immigration Policy and
the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1437 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Developments).
Illegal aliens fear deportation, see, e.g., INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 390, 395;
Hiller, Immigration Policies of the Reagan Administration, 44 V. PITT. L. REV. 495, 502 (1983),
and this fear renders them susceptible to exploitation because they have limited power to object
to unlawful working conditions. Ortega, Plight of the Mexican Wetback, 58 A.B.A. J. 251 (1972),
reprinted in MEXICAN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES: HtsTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
187, 189-90 (G. Kiser & M. Kiser eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MEXICAN WORKERS); LOPEZ,
supra note 9, at 629. For example, North and Houstoun found that 240Jo of the illegal aliens
they interviewed received less than the minimum wage. North & Houstoun, supra note 14, at
224. Flagrant violations of protective legislation lead to disrespect, by illegal aliens and legal
residents, for all laws. "Wholesale evasion of the law must inevitably breed contempt for the
law." s. WEINTRAUB & s. Ross, supra note 5, at 5; see also, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra
note 6, at 399; Lopez, supra note 9, at 629, 707.
This exploitation, apart from its impact on American workers, harms aliens who work in jobs
violating legislative definitions of fair wages and safe conditions. Minimum wage, health, and
safety legislation applies to all workers regardless of legal status in the United States. Briefing
Paper, Protective Labor Laws and Illegal Migrants, in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. E,
at 239. As a policy decision, the United States should protect the welfare of the entire work
force. North & Houstoun, supra note 14, at 231.
16. The one-to-one displacement theory holds that illegal aliens directly replace domestic workers
by working harder and accepting lower wages and working conditions. Lopez, supra note 9,
at 631-33. Illegal aliens who overstay their visas - better educated and more skilled than illegal
border crossers - more often replace domestic workers. Chapman, supra note 5, at 37-39.
Still, some authors cite studies casting doubt on the existence of this displacement effect. S.
WEINTRAUB & s. Ross, supra note 5, at 18; W. CORNELIUS, L. CHAVEZ & J. CASTRO, supra note 9 .
.17. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 274; Fogel, supra note 8, at 70-71.
Proponents of this position cite economic evidence that the Bracero program (temporary farm
worker program operated from 1942 to 1965 under various bilateral agreements with Mexico)·
restrained wage increases and caused unemployment among domestic farm workers. For descriptions of the Bracero program, see DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS 23-26
(prepared for the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.) (Comm. Print 1963);
Scruggs, Texas and the Bracero Program, in MEXICAN WORKERS, supra note 15, at 85. For a
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replacement effect and explain that illegal aliens fill jobs that domestic
workers have already abandoned, thereby enabling marginal enterprises
to exist and creating still more jobs. 18
These issues have led to several proposals responding to the presence
of large numbers of illegal aliens. 19 The interests of the several concerned groups must be considered in evaluating these proposals.

B.

Competing Interests

Several groups have interests in solving the problems posed by illegal aliens in the United States: (1) the United States society as a whole;
(2) employers; (3) illegal alien workers; (4) legal United States resident
workers; and (5) sending countries.
1. United States society- The United States has several societal
interests in the resolution of the problem of illegal alien workers. These
discussion of its impact on farm workers' wages, see Briggs, Foreign Labor Programs as an
Alternative to Illegal Immigration into the United States: A Dissenting View, in STAFF REPORT,
supra note 3, app. F, at 141.
This view assumes that United States businesses now employing illegal aliens would respond
to the decrease in available workers by upgrading wages and working conditions to attract domestic
workers, see Note, supra note I, at 360-61, or by converting to less labor-intensive operations,
Fogel, supra note 4, at 72; Reubens, supra note 6, at 107. Both alternatives assume enterprises
sufficiently profitable to justify increased wages or capital investments. See Fogel, supra note
8, at 72; Reubens, supra note 6, at I07. It has been argued, however, that marginal enterprises
will not survive the added costs of higher wages or capital investments. Note, supra note I.
Rigid wage systems may require increases for several job categories if employers raise the lowest
wages to attract domestic workers, creating costs greater than the employer can cover. Martin
& Houstoun, The Future of International Labor Migration, 33 J. INT'L AFF. 311, 325-26 (1979).
Some marginal enterprises will close, resulting in a loss of jobs filled by legal and illegal workers.
Reubens, supra note 6, at 103. Galbraith reports that many European businesses would close
without foreign workers. J. GALBRAITII, THE NATURE OF MASS POVERTY 129-30 (1979). Fogel,
however, argues that closings will occur less often than employers intimate. Fogel, supra note
8, at 72.
Alternatively, enterprises may move to areas of lower labor costs. Morgan & Gardner, Potential for a U.S. Guest-Worker Program in Agriculture: Lessons from the Braceros, in THE GATEWAY:
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND POLICIES 361, 407 (8. Chiswick ed. 1982). The increase
in the number of companies operating across the Mexican border illustrates the flow of enterprises away from more costly labor markets. Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, A Phased-Out Guest
Worker Proposal, in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. F, at 343, 358.
18. See E. THOMAS, IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE: THEIR LEGAL STATUS 218
(1982); Fogel, supra note 8, at 71; Reubens, supra note 6, at 103-04. Further, higher wages alone
might not attract domestic workers. S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, supra note 5, at 103.
19. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE supra note 6, at 79 (describing a proposed temporary worker
program); SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note I (proposing temporary status with an opportunity
to adjust to permanent resident alien); Briggs, supra note 17, at 154 (describing proposed temporary worker programs); Cook, Amnesty/Temporary Worker Plan, in STAFF REPORT, supra
note 3, app. F, at 338 (proposing temporary worker status); Lansing & Alabart, The Reagan

Administration Proposals on Immigration: The Problem of the Undocumented Alien in the United
States, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. I (1983) (describing proposal for renewable term temporary residence);
Reubens, supra note 6, at 119 (recommending a temporary worker program).
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include maintenance of economic health 20 and enforcement of laws. 21
The United States also has an interest in maintaining good relations
with countries sending large numbers of illegal aliens, 22 and that interest may influence the viability of any response to the large number
of illegal aliens.
2. Employers- Employers of illegal aliens have an interest in the
continued presence of workers willing to accept jobs. 23 This interest
coincides with society's interest in the continued survival of enterprises
employing domestic and illegal alien workers. If aliens are taking jobs
no one else will take, or taking jobs at lower wages, they aid the profitability of the employer. If employers seek to exploit illegal aliens,
however, their interest conflicts with society's interest in enforcement
of worker protection legislation.
3. Aliens working in the United States- Alien workers have an
interest in entering the United States. For some, the interest lies in
the opportunity to immigrate. Unfortunately, not all who wish to live

20. To the extent that illegal aliens displace domestic workers, income transfer payments
rise. See supra note 19. On the other hand, if employers raise wages and increase capital investments and then raise prices, consumers suffer. If marginal enterprises close or relocate to
other countries, domestic workers in those enterprises and the economy suffer.
An adequate supply of workers serves as another indicator of economic health. Gregory, A
Mexican Temporary Workers Program: The Search for Codetermination, in STAFF REPORT, supra
note 3, app. F, at 281,288 (concluding that unskilled jobs not replaced by automation will remain unfilled); Reubens, supra note 6, at 104 (predicting a shortage of unskilled and semiskilled
workers); Whelan, Principles of U.S. Immigration Policy, 44 U. Prrr L. REv. 447, 475 (1983)
(noting an aging population and a shortage of unskilled workers).
21. The United States interests require enforcement of the immigration laws. See·Fuchs, Directions for U.S. Immigration Policy: Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law, 44 U. PITT. L.
REv. 433, 440 (1983). United States interests also require enforcement of worker protection laws.
Such laws apply to all workers. See supra note 15. Illegal aliens threaten protective standards
because employers can violate the laws without fear that aliens will complain. See supra note
15. Maintenance of standards requires increased enforcement. Fogel, supra note 8, at 66. For
a general discussion of protective labor laws, see Notre Dame University Law School, Employer
Sanctions: Research Study, in STA_FF REPORT, supra note 3, app. E, at 568, 572 [hereinafter
cited as Notre Dame Project].
22. See Developments, supra note 15, at 1459 & n.132 (noting the need to meet the interests
of sending countries sufficiently to secure their cooperation in preventing illegal entry into the
United States). The impact of foreign relations on immigration policy is clearly presented in
United States relations with Mexico. An estimated 600Jo of the illegal aliens in the United States
are Mexicans. Id. at 1436 & n.13. The 2000 mile United States border with Mexico has an interdependent economy. See NORTH, BORDER CROSSERS, supra not~ 14, at 2194, 2213. Workers
have historically moved freely across the border. See Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 667, and
United States employers have historically recruited workers in Mexico. See Bustamante & Martinez, supra note 9, at 266. The federal government implicitly participates in entry by frequent
relaxation of border enforcement, see Cardenas, U.S. Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: An
Historical Perspective, 2 CHICANO L. REv. 66, 91 (1975), and by relatively small resource allocations to enforcement, see Chiswick, supra note 11.
23. See supra notes 16-18.
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permanently in the United States will have the opportunity to do so. 2 '
For other aliens, the interest in entering the United States is an interest
in temporary work. Historically, many immigrants intend to return to
their home country in a position to enjoy a better life. 25 Nevertheless,
United States immigration law and policy, with the exception of the
limited H -2 program, 26 only provides immigration for permanent
residence.
Undocumented workers in this country have an interest in
acknowledgement of their basic human rights, 21 the consistent application of protective legislation, a clear statement of their rights to social
services and income transfer programs. In addition, many illegal aliens
working in the United States have contributed to the economy. They
deserve recognition for this contribution. 28 They also deserve a clear
determination of their responsibility for tax payments.
24. No more than 20,000 visas issue to natives of an individual country each year. INA §
202(a), 8 U .S.C. § ll 52(a) (1982). Within this ceiling, visa allocations occur within preference
categories. Four of seven preference categories consist of family members of citizens and permanent resident aliens. INA §§ 202(b), 203(a)(l), (2), (4), (5), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), ll53(a)(I),
(2), (4), (5). One preference category covers members of professions or workers with exceptional
ability. INA§ 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(a)(3). One category covers workers "performing specified
skilled or unskilled labor . . . for which a shortage of employable and willing persons exists
in the United States." INA § 203(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6). A seventh category includes all
persons not within the first six categories. Visas in this seventh category were last available in
1978. Chiswick, supra note 11, at 950; Developments, supra note 15, at 1337.
25. w. CORNELIUS, L. CHAVEZ & J. CASTRO, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS AND SournERN CALIFORNIA: A SUMMARY OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE 57-58 (1982); Campo, Spain, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR
MIGRATION IN EUROPE 156, 158 (R. Krane ed. 1979) (saving to buy an apartment or tools to.
work independently for Spanish workers); Kessner, Repatriation in American History, in STAFF
REPORT, supra note 3, app. A, at 287; THOMAS, The Migratory_Phenomenon and Returning
Migrants in Turkey (A Case Study), in IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN EUROPE: THEIR LEGAL STATUS
4 (Thomas ed. 1982) (saving to start business or buy farm for Turkish workers migrating to Europe).
European guest workers initially intend to go home. Reimann & Reimann, Federal Republic
of Germany, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION IN EUROPE, supra, at 63, 69; Hoffman-Nowotny
& Killias, Switzerland, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION IN EUROPE, supra, at 45, 60-61.
Several factors pressure aliens to remain in the host country: adjustment to the rewards of an
industrial society, formation or immigration of families, inadequate savings to achieve goals upon
return to the home country, scarcity of jobs in the sending country, and continuing availability
of jobs in the host country. Martin & Houstoun, supra note 17, at 327. European countries,
recognizing the dependence of their econoinic structure on the presence of alien workers, have
moved to encourage alien workers to remain. Rist, The European Economic Community (EEC)
and Manpower Migrations: Policies and Prospects, 33 J. INT'L AFF. 201, 215 (1979).
26. Named for the authorizing section, INA§ 10l(a)(l5)(H)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l5)(H)(ii)
(1982). For a description see infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
27. Ortega, supra note 15, at 195 (advocating the need to recognize basic human rights of
illegal aliens); Lopez, supra note 9, at 695. For a discussion of the rights accorded aliens in
Europe, see E. THOMAS, IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN EUROPE: THEIR LEGAL STATUS 244 (1982); Chaney,
Migrant Workers and National Boundaries: The Basis for Rights and Protections, in BOUNDARIES:
NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS 54-58 (Brown & Shue eds. 1981).
28. Imported workers remove labor bottlenecks, allow capital investment by their willingness
to work second and third shifts, delay wage increases, allow domestic workers to move to more
skilled jobs, make fewer demands for social services and move into and out of jobs, increasing
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4. Citizens and resident aliens working in the United States- Resident workers, both citizens and permanent resident aliens, have an interest in the protection of their jobs, wages, and working conditions.
This interest is defeated when illegal aliens displace domestic workers
in available jobs but is supported when the presence of additional
workers enables employers to continue employing domestic workers.
Domestic workers also benefit, as do citizens, from lower prices for
goods and services that result from continued operation of marginal
enterprises. If such enterprises close, decreased supply would lead to
higher prices. Likewise, increased wages would lead to higher prices.
5. Sending countries- Sending countries have an interest in the
protection of their citizens from exploitation while living and working
in the United States 29 and in the continued availability of United States
work for their citizens. Immigration and temporary work serve as safety
valves for countries with high rates of unemployment and underemployment, easing the social and political tensions that limited job opportunites create. 30 Remittances sent by workers in the United States aid
the economies of sending countries. 31
Any successful solution to the problem of the presence of large
numbers of illegal alien workers in the United States must consider
all of these competing and overlapping interests. 32 Each proposed solu-

the flexibility of the economy. Power, The Great Debate on Illegal Immigration - Europe and
INT'L AFF. 239, 241 (1979); Developments, supra note 15, at 1453
(arguing that in a participation model of immigration, rights correlate with social and economic
involvement in society).
29. For one expression of this concern, see Echeverria, Mexico's Recent Position on Workers
for the United States, in MEXICAN WORKERS, supra note 15, at 124.
30. See S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, supra note 5; Reubens, supra note 6, at 124.
Sending countries also benefit from eventual return of workers trained in the host country,
according to one theory. Rist, supra note 25, at 202. This benefit may be offset if the workers
do not return to their country of origin, . Bustamante & Martinez, supra note 9, at 282, or if
the host country requires more and more new workers, Rist, supra note 25, at 204; Widgren,
Sweden, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIORATION IN EuROPE 19, 40 (R. Krane ed. 1979). Some labor
exporting countries now also import labor. See J. POWER, WESTERN EUROPE'S MIGRANT WORKERS
23 (Minority Rights Oroup Report No. 28, 1979).
31. S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, supra note S, at S (identifying remittances as foreign aid to
sending country); Lansing & Alabart, supra note 19, at 34 (reporting that remittances to Mexico
total between I.Sand 3 billion U.S. dollars yearly). Remittances, however, have negative effects.
E. THOMAS, IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN EUROPE: THEIR LE0AL STATUS 4 (1982) (noting that remittances purchase consumer goods, often goods manufactured in the host rather than the sending
country); Martin & Houstoun, supra note 17, at 329 (identifying the increased demand for consumer goods as a factor in wage increases, inflation, a shift to capital-intensive production methods,
and fewer industrial jobs; rising land costs; decreased numbers of workers available for the local
work force; urbanization and a decrease in agricultural production); Poitras, supra note 9, at
161 (acknowledging that remittances support the host country economy because aliens and their
families purchase United States consumer goods).
32. Developments, supra note 15, at 14S8.

the USA Compared, 33 J.
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tion to the presence of illegal aliens must be reviewed in terms of these
competing interests.
II.

ALTERNATIVES TO A TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM

Immigration analysts have proposed many solutions to the problems
of illegal aliens. These include forced repatriation, legalization of status,
closure of United States borders against future entries of undocumented
aliens, employer sanctions, and several other programs. 33 Some have
also advocated simply that the status quo remain intact. Responsible
participants in the policy dialogue have discussed each of these proposals. Unfortunately, the proponents of these alternatives have failed
to consider the interests of all of the relevant groups, and this failure
results in difficulties with each of the proposed alternatives.

A.

Forced Repatriation

As one alternative, the United States might forcibly repatriate illegal aliens. 34 This would involve locating and deporting all aliens
without legal entry papers or with expired non-immigrant visas.
Implementing this alternative would incur fiscal, economic, social
and foreign policy costs. This program would be expensive, due to
the administrative costs involved in locating illegal aliens scattered
throughout the United States, conducting deportation hearings in accordance with due process requirements 35 and transporting aliens with
insufficient money to cover their own travel costs. 36 In addition, forced
repatriation would strain judicial resources. 37
33. Other alternatives mentioned but not widely discussed include lowering trade barriers
to encourage importation of goods from Mexico, and identifying labor intensive production systems
in agriculture and industry which sending countries can implement. UNITED PREsBYIERIAN CHURCH
IN THE U.S.A. & PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES, MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE
UNITED STATES: CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIAN WITNESS AND NATIONAL POLICY 42 (1981).
34. INS Interior Enforcement Procedures, in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. G, at 69-75
(describing procedures to locate and deport illegal aliens); Reubens, supra note 6, at 113 (arguing
that forced repatriation will be difficult and expensive); Note, supra note I, at 363 (arguing
that administrative costs of forced repatriation are prohibitive). European countries have attempted repatriation programs, including cash payments to induce aliens to return home. The
programs have had limited success. Bovenkerk, The Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION IN EUROPE 118, 129-30 (R. Krane ed. 1979); Koelstra & Simon, France, in id. at 142.
35. See Note, supra note I, at 363-64 & n.124.
36. The Immigration and Naturalization Service pays costs of deportation to the port of
entry and, in many circumstances, to the receiving country. See INA§ 243(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(c)
(1982).
37. See Gordon, Recent Developments in Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 9 (1977) (general discussion of judicial review of immigration decisions). Goodpaster,
supra note II, at 679, describes the limited involvement of district courts in deportation procedures for illegal aliens apprehended near the Mexican border, and argues that any increased
involvement would overwhelm those courts.
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Economically, mass deportation of illegal workers would be disadvantageous. Agricultural and industrial enterprises currently dependent
upon illegal alien labor would incur costs either in raising wages and
working conditions to attract United States workers or in investing the
funds necessary to convert to less labor-intensive production methods.
Other marginal enterprises would fold or move to countries with lower
labor costs, resulting in loss of jobs currently filled by legal as well
as illegal alien workers.
A program of force.d repatriation could only be accomplished at large
social cost. Procedures for locating and apprehending illegal aliens would
invade the civil rights of citizens and permanent resident aliens. 38 The
invasion of civil rights and the forced deportation of large numbers
of individuals would alter the image of the United States as a humane
country that welcomes people seeking a better life. 39
Forced repatriation may affect American foreign relations. Relations
with countries to which the United States repatriates large numbers
of illegal aliens would deteriorate. 40 Sending countries would have to
integrate returning aliens into their economy. They would also have
to respond to the higher expectations for social services and political
rights held by returning aliens. 41
In contrast, forced repatriation does meet some needs of the United
States society and of the workers of the United States. It would enable
the United States to enforce immigration and worker protection laws.
Moreover, workers deprived of jobs filled by illegal aliens would benefit

38. Note, supra note 1, at 347 n.3, 364 (asserting that massive apprehension would require
a paramilitary effort which in turn would result in violations of the civil rights of citizens and
permanent resident aliens). Apprehension of all illegal aliens would require "more troops than
we sent to Indochina - a patently absurd concept." Badillo, ls Amnesty for Illegal Aliens a
Sound U.S. Policy? Pro, 56 CONG. DIG. 240, 242 (1977); see also Bernsen, Search and Seizure
on the Highway for Immigration Violations: A Survey of the Law, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 69
(1975); Fragomen, Searching for Illegal Aliens: The Immigration Service Encounters the Fourth
Amendment, 13 SAN DIEoo L. REv. 82 (1975).
39. United States citizens and citizens of other countries have an image of the United States
as a humane country which admits immigrants. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at
230; Simpson, supra note 1, at 152.
40. Koelstra & Simon, France, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION IN EUROPE 133, 142 (R.
Krane ed. 1979) (observing that Tunisia encountered problems when Libya sent workers home);
Miller, Reluctant Partnership: Foreign Workers in Franco-Algerian Relations 1962-1979, 33 J.
INT'L AFF. 219, 234 (1979) (noting that Algeria anticipated problems if France repatriated Algerian
workers); Reubens, supra note 6, at 123-24 (noting the deteriorating relations with countries to
which aliens return). Forced repatriation also creates conflicts for other countries to which the
aliens might seek entry. Studlar, Great Britain, in INTERNATIONAL LABoR MIGRATION IN EuROPE
88, 92 (R. Krane ed. 1979) (describing expulsion of Commonwealth country citizens from Kenya
and Uganda; many sought to enter England).
41. M. MILLER, FOREIGN WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE: AN EMERGING POLITICAL FORCE
(1981) (arguing that guest workers develop increased expectations of living standards and political
participation).
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from forced repatriation. Forced repatriation would also eliminate exploitation of those illegal aliens by United States employers. Finally,
countries with lower labor costs would benefit from the relocation of
some United States enterprises.
Forced repatriation does not, however, meet the needs of other interested groups. It would not allow the United States to share its wealth
through the purchase of excess labor from developing countries and
would not meet the employers' needs for workers. Aliens would not
acquire an opportunity to work temporarily in the United States and
many aliens would not have a significant opportunity to immigrate.
Forced repatriation would also result in lost jobs for United States
workers in marginal enterprises that cannot raise wages or improve
working conditions sufficiently to attract United States workers. Finally,
forced repatriation would remove a safety valve from developing countries with high rates of unemployment and underemployment.
The effects on internal politics, United States employers, and international relations suggest that forced repatriation does not provide a
viable alternative. Most importantly, though, this alternative, at most,
solves the result of the problem; it does not deal with the cause of
the illegal alien problem. Forced repatriation removes illegal aliens currently in the United States, but does not modify the factors that encourage aliens to enter or remain in the United States illegally. Those
factors will result in recurrence of the presence of large numbers of
illegal aliens.

B.

Amnesty

Legalizing illegal alien status, usually termed amnesty, presents
another alternative solution to the presence of large numbers of illegal
aliens in the United States. 42 This proposal typically involves adjustment of status to that of permanent resident alien for persons who
can prove a specified length of residence in the United States. 43 Those
who do not meet the time requirement retain varying alternatives, such
as participation in a temporary worker program. 44
Several arguments support granting amnesty to illegal aliens. Legalization eliminates a large class of law breakers by converting persons cur42. For descriptions of amnesty proposals, see D. NORTH, AMNEsTY, CONFERRING LEGAL STATUS
ON ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS (1980); Badillo, supra note 38, at 242; Goodpaster, supra note 11, at
7)1; Note, supra note I, at 363.
43. The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy report, published in 1981,
proposed an amnesty for aliens within the United States since 1980. STAFF REPORT, supra note
3, at 711. Representative Badillo proposed, in 1977, an amnesty date of 1976. Badillo, supra
note 38, at 242.
44. See, e.g., Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 348 (recommending an interim
temporary worker program).
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rently in the country illegally into legal residents. 45 It solves the problems that flow from illegal status, such as vulnerability to exploitation. It meets employers' current needs for unskilled and semi-skilled
workers. Aliens already in the United States retain access to its higher
wages and acquire the opportunity to remain permanently. Amnesty
also protects United States workers from competition with workers fearful of deportation.
There is some question whether an amnesty program would legalize
the status of a significant number of aliens. Experiences with amnesty
programs in other countries 46 indicate that success depends on the form
of notification, extent to which organizations traditionally serving aliens
support the amnesty program, and the extent to which benefits to aliens
from the amnesty program outweigh harms resulting from continued
illegal status. Furthermore, amnesty programs work only to the extent
that potential participants apply for amnesty. Applying, however, involves alerting the government to one's status as an illegal alien. If
the government subjects aliens who apply - but whom the government
finds ineligible - to harsh penalties, this will discourage aliens from
seeking amnesty.
An amnesty program also suffers from some disadvantages. Amnesty
limits sharing the United States wealth to those aliens who have been
present in the country for a specified time period. Other aliens do not
have the opportunity to earn United States wages or to immigrate for
permanent settlement, except through the family preference and limited
worker preference provisions. In addition, persons adjusting to permanent resident alien status would acquire the right to admit immediate
relatives, mushrooming legal immigration. 47 The resulting United States
population growth imposes pressures on natural resources. 48 Perhaps
45. Lansing & Alabart, supra note 19, at 26.
46. D. NORTH, supra note 42 (describing Canadian, British, and Dutch experiences).
47. Permanent resident aliens' spouses, unmarried sons and unmarried daughters are eligible
for visas under preference 2. INA§ 2O3(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(a)(2) (1982). Children (unmarried
and under 21 years of age), spouses, and parents of citizens enter the United States without
regard to the numerical admission system. INA § 2Ol(b), 8 U.S.C. § 115l(b). Several of the
visa preference categories authorize entry of citizens' family members; unmarried sons and
daughters, INA§ 2O3(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(a)(l); married sons and daughters, INA§ 203(a)(4),
8 U.S.C. § I 153(a)(4); brothers and sisters, INA § 2O3(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(a)(5).
In 1982 Congress granted an amnesty to illegal aliens in the Virgin Islands. Concern about
the negative effects of this potential future immigration in the circumscribed environment of
the Virgin Islands led to restrictions on the categories of relatives admissible in the future by
persons adjusting to permanent resident alien status under the terms of the amnesty. Virgin Island
Nonimmigrant Alien Adjustment Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-271, 96 Stat. 1157; S. REP. No.
529, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); D. NORTH, THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ALIEN LEGALIZATION PROGRAM: LESSONS FOR THE MAINLAND 13 (1983).
48. See Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 712 (noting the depletion of natural resources resulting
from the greater size of the U.S. population); see also SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note I,
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more importantly, however, general amnesty may encourage future illegal immigration. The belief that the United States will respond in
the future to the presence of illegal aliens with amnesty may encourage
aliens facing long waits for immigrant visas to enter illegally. 49
Amnesty, like forced repatriation, may solve the problem of illegal
aliens currently in the United States, but does not address the factors
causing the accumulation of large numbers of illegal aliens. 50 Unless
the government controls the flow of illegal aliens through closer enforcement of time limits on the stays for non-immigrants and stricter
enforcement of immigration laws at the borders and ports of entry,
the amnesty program will fail to solve the longterm problem of illegal
aliens.
C.

Border Closure

Closing the border involves prevention of entry except at immigration inspection stations. In addition, it requires greater scrutiny of the
documents of all persons seeking to enter the United States.
Border closure will meet some of the needs of interested groups.
Closing the borders would enable the United States to enforce its immigration and worker protection laws and would prevent the development of a class of workers with limited rights. Border closure would,
indirectly, protect aliens from exploitation by United States employers,
and would protect legal workers from competition with illegal aliens.
Closure of United States borders does, however, entail significant
disadvantages. The civil rights violations necessary to enforce border
closure would harm the United States as a society. 51 Also, the United
States could not redistribute wealth through the purchase of labor from
less developed countries. Moreover, employers would lose access to
willing workers, and their responses might result in a reduction of jobs
at 105 (Statement by Senator East) (arguing that ineligible illegal aliens become eligible for social
service programs, increasing program costs); Chiswick, supra note 11, at 927 (arguing that with
permanent resident alien status, seasonal workers who now leave at the conclusion of their work
period would remain in the United States).
49. See Abrams, American Immigration Policy: How Strait the Gate?, LAW & CoNTEMP.
PRoBs., Spring 1982, at 126; Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 712; Murphy, Is Amnesty for Illegal
Aliens a Sound U.S. Policy? Con, 56 CONG. DIG. 249, 255 (1977).
50. Jobs draw immigrants. Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 652; Scanlan, Immigration Law
and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 846 (1982); Note, supra note
I, at 358. Other factors in sending countries also induce immigration. Krane, INTERNATIONAL
LABOR MIGRATION IN EUROPE 4 (R. Krane ed. 1979) (citing urbanization and imbalance in regional
development as factors inducing immigration); Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 665 (arguing that
reports by returning migrants encourage immigration); Scanlan, supra at 844 (arguing that wage
disparity and the mobility of populations facilitates immigration); Simpson, supra note I, at
154 (describing population growth and economic stagnation as influencing immigration).
51. See Reubens, supra note 6, at 128 (arguing that border closure results in civil rights
violations).
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available to legal workers or a rise in prices for goods and services.
Finally, many aliens would not have the opportunity for temporary
United States work or permanent immigration, and sending countries
would lose the safety valve of sending workers to the United States.
Closing United States borders to all entry would also create administrative, social, and foreign relations costs. 5 2 The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) must bear the significant administrative
cost of closing the border. Stricter. inspection at ports of entry and
along the thousands of miles of United States borders with northern
and southern neighbors would require more INS officers. Changes in
border patrol methods and perhaps in the open state of the border
might prove necessary. 53
A variety of social costs parallel the administrative costs. Citizens
of the United States may object to the invasion of rights and privacy
of citizens and permanent resident aliens necessary to the screening
of all entrants. Actions necessary to close the long stretches of open
borders, resembling actions by · other governments to prevent their
citizens from crossing borders, 54 would also raise concerns. Further,
sending countries might object to treatment of their citizens seeking
entry to the United States. Finally, other third world countries might
categorize border closing efforts as a denial of responsibility to share
United States wealth with less developed countries.
Many illegal aliens enter the United States on non-immigrant visas
and remain beyond the time authorized by those visas, requiring enforcement of non-immigrant visa time limits to eliminate increases in
the numbers of illegal aliens. Enforcement of visa time limits would
require different actions 55 from those required to close the borders but
would create similar burdens. Enforcing visa time limits would also
meet interests parallel to those met by border closure.

D.

Employer Sanctions

Proposals for employer sanctions address one of the major pull factors drawing illegal aliens to the United States, the opportunity to work.
Although specific proposals vary, 56 all impose a penalty on persons
See D. NORTH, REVIEW OF OPTIONS, supra note 14.
53. For a description of current border enforcement procedures, see INS Border Enforcement Procedures, supra note 34, at 77.
54. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 4, at (i(); Comment, supra note 13,
52.

at 465.

55. For a description of current internal enforcement procedures, see INS Interior Enforcement Procedures, supra note 34.
56. For discussions of employer sanctions, see Lansing & Alabart, supra note 19; Loeff,
Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy Task Force on Work Eligibility/Employer Responsibility, in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. E, at 377; Notre Dame Pro-
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employing illegal aliens. 57 Some proposals punish only "knowing"
employment of illegal aliens. 58 Much of the dispute about employer
· sanctions focuses on the methods by which employers will verify the
legal status of job applicants. Alternatives 59 include a worker identity
card 60 and a computerized data bank of information about workers. 61
Proponents argue that employer sanctions would meet the United
States need to reduce the number of illegal aliens. An employer sanction program would encourage employers to hire domestic workers by
increasing the cost of hiring illegal aliens. Aliens, without the pull of
United States wages, would not enter illegally. This would, necessarily,
avoid exploitation of aliens by United States employers and would protect legal workers from competition with illegal aliens.
Acknowledging that an effective employer sanction program would
eliminate the incentive for illegal aliens to seek work in the United
States, opponents of such a program point to associated costs.
Disseminating information about potential employees may have
deleterious effects on civil liberties. The potential for government abuse
of any information system provides a strong reason for extreme caution in implementing an employer sanctio.n program. 62 The establishment of such a system would also be expensive. Employers would face
paperwork costs in verifying applicants' status and maintaining records
of that verification. 63 Members of various ethnic groups may be
ject, supra note 21; Scanlan, supra note 50, at 842; Work Eligibility Task Force, Enforcement
of Employer Sanctions for the Employment of Undocumented Aliens; A Working Paper, in
STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. E, at 257.
57. Murphy, Is Amnesty for Illegal Aliens a Sound U.S. Policy? Con, 56 CONG. DIG. 249,
253 (1977) (recommending criminal penalties); Notre Dame Project, supra note 21, at 636 (recommending several levels of civil penalties). Allocation of penalties collected to the INS budget
provides incentive for enforcement, Schweiker, Is Amensty for Illegal Aliens a Sound U.S. Policy?
Con, 56 CONG. DIG. 235, 241 (1977).
58. Several proposals provide a statutory defense if the employer proves that he saw appropriate identification. Notre Dame Project, supra note 21, at 613 & 631; Comment, supra
note 13, at 459.
59. Scanlan, supra note 50, at 845 (discussing other, admittedly less effective, alternatives).
60. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 4, at 58; SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra
note l, at 8-9; Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 345.
The Social Security Administration objects to the suggested use of social security cards, see
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 4, at 58, and problems exist. See Lansing & Alabart,
supra note 19, at 22 (noting the potential for civil rights violations); Comment, supra note 13,
at 463 (describing the potential for forgery).
61. See D. NORTH, REVIEW OF OPTIONS, supra note 14. Objections include political, practical, and personal concerns. Notre Dame Project, supra note 21, at 677, 684, 685.
62. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note l, at 9 (noting that limitations imposed on the system
might prevent abuse); Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 705 (noting past abuse of government record
keeping and the costs, effort and time necessary to implement an identification system); Recent
Developments, Immigration Law: Control of Immigration into the United States - Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1982, S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), 23 HARV. INT'L L.J.
410, 414 (1983) (citing concern about a national data bank).
63. Recent Developments, supra note 62, at 414 (discussing paperwork costs to employers).
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discriminated against by employers unwilling to risk hiring an illegal
alien. 64
Employer sanctions also do not meet the interests of aliens or of
sending countries. Illegal aliens will lose the -opportunity to work at
United States wages, even for temporary periods of time as illegal en. trants. Employer sanctions will also eliminate the ability of sending
countries to alleviate their problems of unemployment and
underemployment.
Opponents of employer sanctions also raise issues concerning
enforcement. 65 Countries with employer sanctions have not consistently
enforced those laws. 66 Factors inhibiting enforcement include limited
staff allocation, limits on. communication between the enforcement
agency and other agencies that may have information useful to the
enforcing agency, and constraints on investigative techniques. 67 An enforced employer sanction program imposes high civil rights and privacy
costs on illegal aliens and legal workers alike without solving the underlying problem of the presence of large numbers of illegal aliens.

E.

Retain the Status Quo

Retaining the status quo, failing to escalate responses to the illegal
alien problem, presents a finat alternative. 68 This alternative has the
political attractiveness of not requiring a change in policy. It meets
the needs currently served by illegal immigration: employers have access to a pool of willing workers and aliens have access to work at
United States wage levels.
Ignoring the problem, however, fails to meet the needs of several
interest groups. The United States inadequately enforces immigration
and other laws. Aliens continue to enter or remain illegally, may be
exploited by employers, and have limited access to social service pro64. Employers may use the threat of penalties to justify actions which constitute discrimination against members of ethnic groups associated with high levels of illegal aliens. Goodpaster,
supra note 11, at 704; Comment, supra note 13, at 460.
65. Employers may evade responsibility through subcontracting arrangements. Light penalties
will become a cost of doing business. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS REGARDING EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS IN SELECTED CoUNTRIES 2 (1982). Enforcement requires employer cooperation. Scanlan, supra note 50, at 844. Many employers will,
however, comply voluntarily. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 4, at 57.
66. GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, supra note 65, at 2. The "knowing employment" requirement in the Canadian law led the enforcement agency to focus initial activities on educating
employers. Id. at 3. Large German employers contracted with smaller exempt firms to provide
workers. Id.
67. 1d: at 2.
68. Legislative inaction and the budget process tend to maintain the status quo. Keely, The
Development of U.S. Immigration Policy Since 1965, 33 J. INT'L AFF. 249, 261 (1979). The
status quo is always changing, however, because of the number of new immigrants each year.
Gregory, supra note 20, at 289.
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grams. Legal workers face continued competition from illegal aliens.
Sending countries retain the option for their citizens to seek work in
the United States and for remittances from those workers, but only
at the cost of limited protection for those citizens. In light of the growing
concern about the numbers of illegal aliens and their effects on United
States society, this alternative becomes increasingly difficult to defend.
III.

DESIGNING A TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM: FROM CURRENT
PROPOSALS TO A MODEL STATUTE

Several proposals for temporary worker programs have been
developed. These include proposals to (1) expand the existing H-2 pro- .
gram, (2) provide interim temporary worker programs to help employers
adjust to a smaller labor pool, and (3) implement temporary worker
programs of indefinite duration. Unfortunately each of these various
proposals leaves some significant problems unsolved.
A.

Expanded H-2 program

One proposal advocates expansion of the current H-2 temporary
worker program. 69 This small program currently provides approximately
30,000 workers annually to a limited number of agricultural employers. 10
An employer requests the Department of Labor to certify that qualified
domestic workers are not "available and willing to work. " 11 Based on
that certification, the INS provides visas for temporary workers, whom
the employers may then recruit. 72 Dissatisfied employers may send
workers home or reject specific workers, 73 giving workers a strong incentive to please employers. H-2 workers arrive without dependents, 74
remain in the United States for relatively short periods of time, 75 and
leave the United States at the conclusion of their work assignments. 76
69. The Simpson-Mazzoli bill includes a proposal to expand the H~2 program. See SENATE
STAFF REPORT, supra note I, at 44.
70. D. NORTH, NONIMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE U.S.: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 68 (1978); Migrant Legal Action Program, supra note 3.
71. For descriptions of the Department of Labor certification procedure for H-2 workers,
see Fraade & Arton, Temporary Employment of Foreign Nationals: The "H" Visa, 14 INT'L
L. 235, 247 (1980); Furin, Immigration Law: Alien Employment Certification, 16 INT'L L. 111
(1982); Manulkin & Maghame, supra note 14, at 51.
72. The sending country is sometimes involved in recruitment of workers. D. NORTH, supra
note 70, at 57.
73. Employers may request H-2 workers by name, send workers home and receive replacement workers, and "blacklist" a worker, preventing that worker from ever entering the United
States on another H-2 nonimmigrant visa. Id. at 57-58.
74. Migrant Legal Action Program, supra note 3, at 48.
75. H-2 agricultural workers receive visas for a few weeks to a few months. D. NORTH, supra
note 70, at 57.
76. H-2 workers do not overstay their visas to join the pool of illegal aliens in the United
States. Reubens, supra note 6, at 118.
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The federal government excuses employers from withholding social
security and federal income taxes and from contributing to social security
taxes, 11 but employers still must pay a minimum wage and provide
working conditions approved by the Department of Labor. 78
Nonetheless, the right of employers to send workers home for unsatisfactory conduct severely limits the ability of H-2 workers to organize for
collective action, a right that the National Labor Relations Act grants
to all workers. 79
An expanded H-2-program would provide some benefits. It would
enable the United States to distribute wealth to less developed countries by employing workers from those countries. Employers would
have ·continuing access to needed workers, though accompanied by the
costs and delays associated with Department of Labor certification of
worker need. Foreign workers would have the opportunity to earn
United States wages and sending countries would have the option of
United States employment for their surplus workers.
Without greater protection of the rights of H-2 workers, however,
the wealth distribution resulting from such an expanded program would
occur at the expense of creating a larger group of second-class workers.
As employers sought the lower labor costs accruing from employment
of H-2 workers, they might systematically exclude United States
workers from some forms of eqiployment. H-2 workers would not enjoy many of the rights accorded United States workers and would not
acquire any greater opportunity to immigrate to the United States. Sending countries would have some, but limited, control over the rights
accorded their citizens working in the H-2 program.
Expansion of the H-2 program would aggravate a number of problems. An employer paying equal wages to H-2 and United States workers
saves at least nine percent of labor costs for H-2 workers by the exemption of employer contributions to social security taxes. 80 This in
effect confers a bonus upon employers for hiring foreign workers. Indeed, under the present H-2 program, some employers may refuse to
hire United States workers while awaiting Department of Labor certification of the unavailability of United States workers. 81 Further,
because the continued employment of H-2 workers depends on employer
satisfaction with all aspects of their behavior, employers may exten77. D. NORTH, supra note 70, at 59; Migrant Legal Action Program, supra note 3, at 43.
78. The Department of Labor establishes adverse wage rates, based on prevailing wages.
Employers must offer H-2 workers those wages and working conditions. Fraade & Arton, supra
note 71, at 250; Migrant Legal Action Program, supra note 3, at 44.
79. See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976); Migrant Legal Action
Program, supra note 3, at 42-43.
80. D. NORTH, supra note 70, at 59. Martin & Houstoun, supra note 17, at 324 (estimating
that employers save 25% to 35% of wage payments).
81. Migrant Legal Action Program, supra note 3, at 51.
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sively exploit such workers through inadequate recording of working
time, overcharging for inadequate housing and meals, and witholding
of wages earned. 82 Finally, an extended H-2 program would increase
administrative costs in determining the unavailability of United States
workers. 83
The administrative problems and the potential for worker exploitation involved in an expanded H-2 program render it an undesirable
alternative. Consequently, the model temporary ,worker program proposed in this Note does not incorporate an expansion of the H-2 program. Further the model program does not exempt employers from
payment of social security and other taxes, restrict workers to single
employers, or involve the Department of Labor in certifying the shortage of workers for specific jobs.
·

B.

Interim Temporary Worker Programs

Interim temporary worker programs, designed to exist for only a few
years, 84 serve two purposes. First, interim programs provide an alternative to forced repatriation for aliens ·ineligible for amnesty because
of, time limits or because of failure to meet a continuous residence
requirement. 85 Second, such program'.s provide an adjustment period
for enterprises now dependent on an illegal alien work force. 86
An interim temporary worker program, however, is a poor complement to amnesty. The program may not provide a sufficiently strong
incentive to encourage illegal aliens to apply for amnesty. Aliens applying for amnesty will no doubt consider the government's response
to those applicants who do not meet the eligibility requirements. An
ineligible illegal alien may face only the alternatives of deportation or
participation in a temporary worker program. Illegal aliens who want
to immigrate will have little incentive to risk identifying themselves
to the federal government to determine their eligibility for amnesty.
The alternative of temporary work in the United States offers an incentive only to those illegal aliens who wish to remain in the United
States for temporary work purposes. 87
82. D. NORTH, supra note 70, at 86.
83. Migrant Legal Action Program, supra note 3, at 19 (describing costs of Department of
Labor certification); see also Rodino, The Impact of Immigration on the American Labor Market,
27 RUTGERS L. REv. 245 (1974) (describing the labor certification program).
84. See, e.g., Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 349 (recommending five years).
85. Cook, supra note 19, at 338; Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 348.
86. Goodpaster, supra note II, at 718 (describing the need for interim provisions for employers
currently dependent on illegal alien workers).
87. Cornelius, Legalizing the Flow of Temporary Migrant Workers from Mexico: A Proposal, in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. F, at 307, 309. Some proposals do include the right
to adjust to permanent resident status as an incentive for aliens interested in permanent settlement in the United States. Id. at 313.
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Interim programs cause numerous other difficulties. They do not
allow the United States to distribute a portion of its wealth by purchasing labor from other countries, or provide a continuing supply
of labor. 88 In addition, they do not enable aliens to enter the United
States labor market in future years.
In order to avoid these difficulties, this Note prop·oses a model program of indefinite duration, providing continuous alien access to the
United States labor market.

A- Temporary Worker Program of Indefinite Duration:
Structuring A Model Program From the Proposed Programs
C.

Proposed temporary worker programs of indefinite duration represent a range of possible program structures. 89 The model program proposed in this Note, designed to meet the needs of the interest groups,
combines the strong features of the several proposed temporary worker
programs. A number of differing features in these programs must be
considered to determine which program can best serve aliens and sending countries, while advancing the interest of the United States, its labor
force and private employers.
I. Freedom of job movement- The freedom of temporary workers
to change jobs largely defin~s the rights and liberties of those workers.
Nonetheless, most temporary worker programs allow little freedom of
job movement. 90 One proposed program would restrict temporary
workers to sectors of the economy that would otherwise experience
worker shortages. 91 Another proposal recommends the issuance of visas
to workers with specific contracts in the United States. 92 Other proposals provide temporary workers more complete freedom of job
movement.
The model program proposed in this Note, recognizing the relationship between freedom to change jobs and other worker rights, places
no restrictions on worker access to jobs. This decision prevents the
88. Interim proposals limit future entry of workers. Yet some experts predict a United States·
shortage of low-skilled workers. The extent to which enterprises currently dependent on illegal
alien labor will' adjust by raising '\\'ages or investing in less labor-intensive production methods,
rather than closing or moving to countries offering less costly labor, remains subject to debate.
Interim programs rest, however, on the assumption that enterprises w,ill remain in the. United
States and will hire more domestic workers.
89. See, e.g., Cornelius, supra note 87; Gregory, supra note 20; Mines, A Temporary Work
Permit Program for Mexicans (1979), in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. F,: at 327.
90. The restriction to specific employers encourages exploitation of H-2 workers. D. NORTH,
supra note 70, at 57; Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 351; Briggs, supra note 17, at 154.
91. Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 350-51 (recommending restriction of temporary workers to sectors of the economy certified by the Department of Labor as needing workers).
92. Gregory, supra note 20, at 303.
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institutionalization of a second class of workers. It also eliminates the
need to increase enforcement of worker protection legislation to protect temporary work visa holders from exploitation.
2. Number of visas- If a temporary worker program seeks to
preempt illegal migration for work, it must allow for a sufficient number
of visas to meet the needs of United States employers for workers 93
and must provide potentially illegal entrants with the likelihood of legal
admission. Long waits for receipt of temporary work visas will not
draw potentially illegal entrants into the legal program.
Several proposals recommend that the determination of the number
of visas issued in any year would rest upon an assessment of the needs
of United States employers. 94 Another proposal recommends that the
needs of the sending country also be considered in determining the
yearly number of temporary worker visas. 95
The model temporary worker program proposed in this Note recommends issuance of 500,000 temporary work visas during the first year,
a number large enough to encompass the majority of estimated yearly
illegal entrants. The model program also provides yearly adjustments
in the numbers of visas issued, based on information collected by the
Department of Labor about United States labor needs. Due to the inadequacy of current information, the model program includes a provision for the Department of Labor to develop a new data collection
system.
3. Visa time period- Temporary worker proposals specify the time
period of each visa, ranging from six months 96 to two years. 97 If the
proposal anticipates that temporary workers will fill jobs that are temporary or seasonal in nature, the time span provided should reflect
that decision.
Several conflicting policies influence the decision about the length
of stay for each visa. Short stays provide a limited time for workers
to locate jobs and recover travel costs, decreasing the potential savings
workers can realize from each trip. Workers with a limited time to
earn United States wages may prove more willing to accept unsafe working conditions in return for higher wages, undercutting efforts to improve worker safety.
On the other hand, longer stays result in more disruption of family
relationships if visa holders may not bring their families. Longer stays

93. The recommended numbers range from 50,000, see Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra
note 17 at 350, to 750,000, see Cornelius, supra note 87, at 316.
94. Cornelius, supra note 87, at 315; Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 351.
95. Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 348.
96. Cook, supra note 19, at 339.
97. Mines, supra note 89, at 333.
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also weaken ties with the home culture and increase the chance that
the worker will develop expectations dependent on United States culture.
The model program proposed 'in this Note incorporates a moderate
alternative in which visas would remain valid for twelve months of
work over a twenty-four month period. The twelve months do not have
to be consecutive, providing flexibility for aliens who want to alternate between working in the United States in seasonal agricultural jobs,
and working in the home country during seasonal periods of limited
United States agricultural employment.
4. Adjustment of status- For aliens who want to immigrate to
the United States, the opportunity to acquire an immigrant visa would
offer a strong incentive to participate in a legal temporary worker program rather than to enter the United States illegally. Some proposals
include provisions allowing for the eventual adjustment of status to
permanent resident alien after participation in the temporary worker
program. 98
The model program proposed in this Note also facilitates the desire
of some aliens to immigrate. Aliens may renew their temporary work
visas and may apply for adjustment of status to permanent resident
alien after five years of participation in the temporary work program.
5. Exit checking system- Many illegal aliens who initially entered
the United States legally have overstayed the time allowed by their visa.
To avoid a repetition of this pattern, a temporary worker program
must insure that aliens entering on temporary worker visas leave at
the expiration of those visas.
The enforcement of exit requirements occurs more easily when
workers are bonded to specific employers, as with the H-2 program.
In light of the negative aspects of restricting workers to single employers,
however, the solution embodied jn the H-2 program is inadequate. Alternative means of assuring timely departure _have been recommended.
The implementation of a computerized record-keeping system for tern-:
porary worker visas would aid in monitoring the exit of temporary
workers. 99 Some proposals prohibit the issuance of another visa, for
temporary work or permanent immigration, to aliens who fail to leave
at the termination of their temporary visa period. 100 Other proposals
incorporate stronger pressures to abide by the visas time limit. One
proposal decreases the ·number of new visas available to a sending country for each visa that has not been turned in at expiration. 101 Another

98. See Cook, supra note 19, at 340; Cornelius, supra note ·87, at 313; Gregory, supra note
20, at 304; Mines, supra note 89.
99. Cornelius, supra note 87, at 311.
100. Id. at 311.
IOI. See Reubens, supra note 6, at 123.
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builds on the social structure of the aliens' sending community: when
one temporary visa holder exits, turning in a visa, that visa would be
issued to an individual whom the first visa holder nominated at the
time of the initial visa application. An alien who knows that a relative
or neighbor will receive a visa only after his return has a strong incentive to turn in the temporary work visa and return home. 102
The model program proposed in this Note, recognizing the role of
social pressures and the potential contribution of the sending countries to encouragement of return migration, provides for a decrease
in the number of new visas available to a sending country for those
aliens who overstay their temporary work visa. The model program
incorporates a computerized system for monitoring the entry and exit
of temporary visa holders and prohibits the issuance of new visas to
persons who have overstayed a temporary work visa.
6. Admission of dependents- The admission of dependents of aliens
raises numerous issues and concerns. First, dependents increase the
numbers of individuals seeking access to social services, such as health
care and education. 103 Second, workers whose family members move
to the host country are less likely to return home. Third, aliens seeking to accumulate money will save more by supporting dependents in
the sending country than in the United States. Still, the psychological
costs that individual workers and their families incur because of separation during periods of United States work are a consideration in favor
of admission of family members.
Current temporary worker proposals encompass a variety of alternatives, including prohibition of entry of family members, 10 • admission of spouse on the worker's third temporary worker visa, 105 and
open admission of family members. 106
The model program proposed in this Note excludes family members,
due -to the costs incurred in maintaining a family in the United States
and the desire of many illegal aliens to remain only temporarily in
the United States. Although the exclusion may impose some
psychological costs on aliens seeking temporary work, the flexibility
that the model program allows aliens - in the frequency of their en-

102. Mines recommends a system of revolving visas, where the second visa, upon receipt
of the visa surrendered by the first temporary worker on his exit, is issued to an individual
named by the first visa holder at the time of his application for a temporary work visa. Mines,
supra note 89, at 334.
103. For a discussion of the educational rights of children of illegal aliens, see Hull, Undocumented Alien Children and Free Public Education: An Analysis of Plyler v. Doe [457 U.S.
202 (1982)], 44 U. Pm. L. REv. 409 (1983).
104. Cook, supra note 19, at 339.
105. Gregory, supra note 20, at 304.
106. Cornelius, supra note 87, at 313.

WINTER

1984]

Guest Worker Statute

321

try and the duration of their stays - enables workers to return home
as their earnings and savings goals permit.
7. Rights in the workplace- The various temporary worker proposals allow for the full enforcement of worker protection legislatioq,
such as the minimum wage, to guard the interests of aliens. These proposals typically grant aliens the right to join a union, 101 though some
proposals restrict aliens from accepting jobs with employers involved
in labor disputes. 108
The model program proposed in this Note provides full rights to
organize and bargain collectively. The fundamental policy decision that
organization rights accrue to all workers requires extension of this right
to temporary workers. By granting temporary workers the right to join
unions, the model statute provides an incentive to unions to recruit
temporary workers and to safeguard their right to enforcement of health
and safety legislation. The grant of the right to join a union limits
any incentive employers have to exploit alien workers.
8. Social service programs- Many illegal aliens have taxes and
charges for other services, such as health insurance, deducted from
their pay. The majority of illegal aliens receive no benefit from these
payments. Some services, such as workers' compensation, directly relate
to the worker's participation in the work force. The value of other
services, however, varies significantly. For example, the worker who
cannot bring dependent children to the United States for the duration
of the work permit period cannot use education services, but remains
subject to the sales and property taxes that support such services. 109
The temporary worker proposals require employers to withhold income tax payments from wage payments and require employer and
employee contributions to social service programs, such as social
security. 110 Several proposals provide, however, for a return of these
funds to the alien worker in the sending country. 111
To avoid taking taxes as payments for services from which alien
workers do not benefit, a temporary worker program must either allow
access to those services or must refund payments to workers when they
leave the United States. To avoid granting an undue advantage to temporary foreign workers in the competition for United States jobs,
however, the payments required of employers for temporary workers
must equal those required for domestic workers.

107. Cornelius, supra note 87, at 314; Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 355.
108. Cornelius, supra note 87, at 314.
109. For a discussion of tax payments by illegal aliens, see supra note 14.
110. Mines, supra note 89, at 334 (recommending a flat 15 percent tax withheld from wages
of temporary workers); Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note' 17, at 354 (recommending that
employers and employees contribute to social service program taxes).
111. Mines, supra note 89, at 334; Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 355.
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The model program proposed in this Note provides for payment of
employer and employee taxes and for normal contributions to social
programs. The local government continues to impose taxes, since the
alien receives police and fire protection. The extensive administrative
costs involved in exempting the alien from initial payment of the local
tax, or in refunding any of the payments, preclude those alternatives.
Those costs do not apply to payroll withholding taxes and employer
contributions to federal social programs, and consequently those funds
are returned to the worker in the home country. The alien must return
his expired temporary work visa to obtain the refund payment. This
provision equalizes employer labor costs, does not charge the alien for
services from which the alien receives no benefit, insures the alien of
accumulated savings at the conclusion of the work period, and provides an incentive for the alien to return to the home country to collect his savings.

D.

Those Affected by Temporary Worker Programs

Temporary worker programs meet several of the needs of the interested groups - society, employers, aliens, workers, and sending countries. Proponents argue that temporary worker programs would enable
the United States to enforce its immigration and worker protection
laws while meeting the need for unskilled and semi-skilled workers.
Temporary worker programs would also enable the United States to
distribute a portion of its wealth to less developed countries by purchasing surplus labor from those countries.
Employers would have continued access to a large labor pool. By granting job mobility to temporary workers, the program would avoid the costs
incurred by employers and the government in certifying labor shortages.
Aliens would acquire an opportunity to earn United States wages free
from fear of deportation. The temporary workers would enjoy the rights,
protections, wages, and working conditions accorded domestic workers.
Aliens holding temporary work visas would have restricted rights
to social services, but would receive notice of those limitations before
applying to enter the program. Aliens would gain the opportunity to
immigrate. A temporary worker program would protect legal workers
from unfair competition by illegal aliens willing to accept substandard
wages and working conditions.
Sending countries would retain the benefits of immigration. They
would receive relief from pressures resulting from unemployment and
underemployment and would pass income to poorer portions of the
population through temporary worker remittances. In addition, they
would have a greater guarantee of the protection of the rights of their
citizens while they work in the United States.
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Temporary worker programs do not, however, meet all the needs
of all interest groups. Aliens participating in a temporary worker program would face some restrictions on their work, such as length of
time in the United States, access to social services, and entry of family
members. Domestic workers would face competition from temporary
workers. Still, although that competition might retard wage increases,
it might also retard conversion to labor-saving production methods
which result in an overall loss of jobs. Moreover, the temporary workers,
freed from the fear of deportation, would not depress wages and work~
ing conditions by accepting work under exploitive conditions. Finally,
sending countries would continue to experience the loss of enterprising
workers and would encounter rising expectations among returning
workers and their dependents.
Despite these drawbacks, a temporary worker program of indefinite
duration presents the best resolution of the competing interests and
values. Conflicting economic arguments about the positive and negative
effects of large numbers of illegal workers on the economy do not
support a major change in the numbers of available workers by elimination of illegal aliens from the work force. A carefully designed temporary worker program provides for a continued supply of workers
while protecting the interests of United States society, employers,
domestic workers, the aliens themselves, and sending countries.
IV.

MODEL TEMPORARY WORK PROGRAM

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND POLICY
Finding that public policy requires a response to the growing number
of illegal aliens;·
that stricter enforcement of immigration laws serves the public interest;
that the United States benefits from immigration;
that the economy requires a continued supply of unskilled and semiskilled workers which current population patterns will not provide;
that provision of opportunities for citizens of less developed countries to sell their labor at high United States wages benefits those workers
and improves diplomatic relations with less developed countries;
that the present immigration system provides limited opportunity for
aliens without family members in the United States to immigrate;
that aliens working illegally in the United States are subject to
exploitation;
that workers who, because of a fear of deportation, accept wages
and working conditions below the minimum statutory levels subject
legal workers to unfair competition;
and that countries whose citizens become illegal aliens in the United

324

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 17:2

States have an interest in continued access to United States labor markets
for their citizens and in protection of the rights of those citizens while
working in the United States;
this legislation amends the Immigration and Nationality Act by providing for a continuing program of admission of temporary workers.
This amendment is intended to operate in conjunction with a program of sanctions for employers who hire aliens not authorized to work
in the United States and an amnesty authorizing adjustment to permanent resident alien status for illegal aliens in continuous residence in
the United States for the requisite number of years.
SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of the Act, the following words and phrases shall,
unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, have the meanings ascribed
to them in this section:
(a) "Temporary worker" means a person within the United States
on a visa issued pursuant to this Act, authorizing the individual
to seek and hold employment during the time period specified
in the visa document.
(b) "Adjustment of status" means adjustment to permanent resident alien status, with all rights associated with that status, including the right to petition for admission of immediate relatives
and the right to apply for citizenship.
(c) "Visa abuse" means violation of terms of a visa by remaining
in the United States illegally at the expiration of the time period
for which a visa was issued, or working while holding a visa
that does not authorize the visa bolder to work in the United
States.
(d) "Temporary work visa" is a visa authorizing the holder to reside
in the United States for a total of twelve months, not necessarily
consecutive, during the twenty-four months for which the visa
is valid and to hold any job except jobs vacant due to a labor
dispute.
(e) "Rule making procedures" refer to relevant portions of the Administrative Procedure Act, Public Law 404-79th Congress, as
amended.
SECTION 2: INITIAL ISSUANCE OF VISAS
In the first year of this program, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service may issue a maximum of 500,000 temporary work visas under
this program. Aliens who do not meet the amnesty requirements may
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apply for temporary work visas. During the first year, visas will be
issued within the United States, upon application, to aliens present in
the United States at the time of passage of this legislation. In the second
and subsequent years, visas will be issued in sending countries through
normal visa-issuing channels.

Comment
The temporary worker program is intended to fill employers' labor
needs, while limiting the opportunity for undocumented aliens to work.
The program must consequently provide a number of visas roughly
equivalent to the number of new illegal alien worker entrants each year.
A figure of 500,000 visas complies with estimates from several sources.
Limiting first year visas to aliens currently in the United States without
documentation provides an alternative to deportation for persons ineligible for the amnesty program. The restriction to aliens in the United
States at the time of passage of the legislation should serve to prevent
an influx of aliens seeking immediate access to temporary work visas.
SECTION 3: RENEW AL OF VISAS
At the conclusion of a twenty-four month period, aliens may apply
for another temporary work visa. Individual aliens will be eligible for
a temporary work visa only once in each twenty-four month period.
The alien may apply at the United States consulate in the sending country
or, if the alien is in the United States prior to the expiration of one
visa, at a regional office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Comment
This provision seeks to enable aliens without specialized skills or
family members in the United States to acquire an immigrant visa.
The number of years of temporary work required for adjustment to
permanent resident alien status (see Section 7) necessitates receipt of
multiple temporary work visas.
The restrictions on the frequency with which individual aliens can
obtain visas serves two purposes. First, the restriction distributes
available visas- among applicants within a sending country. Second,
the restriction encourages aliens who have spent a period of time working
in the United States to renew work and social ties to their home
community.
. SECTION 4: NUMBER OF TEMPORARY VISAS
In the first year and each year thereafter, the Attorney General, after
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consultation with the Secretaries of Labor, Agriculture, and State, will
establish a maximum number of temporary work visas to be issued
during the following twelve_ month period. The Attorney General shall
consider the supply of labor available in the United States, the desires
of the governments of countries from which individuals have sought
temporary work visas, and recommendations from the several
Secretaries. This list does not exhaust the factors the Attorney General
may consider.

Comment
The temporary work program serves the need for workers that the
supply of domestic workers does not and probably will not meet. It
serves neither as a temporary response to stricter enforcement of the
immigration laws nor as an interim solution to the status of illegal
aliens ineligible for adjustment of status to permanent resident alien.
The program directs the Attorney General to establish, through formal
rule making procedures in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, the methods and criteria relevant in establishing the number
of visas to be issued. The Attorney General retains the discretion,
however, to make the final determination of the number of visas.
SECTION 5: AUTHORIZATION UNDER THE VISA
The temporary work visa authorizes the holder to enter the country
for a total period of twelve months during the twenty-four months
for which the visa is valid. The temporary work visa holder may search
for and hold any job, except that the temporary work visa holder may
not replace workers engaged in a labor dispute. The Secretary of Labor
shall establish, through rule making procedures, regulations for enforcing this exemption.

Comment
The twelve month time period serves as a compromise between competing interests. The workers would favor more time in the United
States, because that would offer greater job opportunities and would
enable them to achieve a higher return for their investment of time
and trouble in obtaining a temporary work visa. Labor unions seeking
to organize these workers would also desire longer work periods during which temporary work visa holders could participate in union
activities. Employers would also want to retain workers once they have
been trained. All of these interests argue for a longer period of work
for each visa holder.
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Various factors, however, militate toward a shorter time period. The
exclusion of family members, discussed in the comment to section 9,
would dissuade many workers from remaining for an extended period.
A shorter stay would also result in less assimilation to the United States
and therefore in less desire to immigrate.
The program rejects restrictions on temporary work visa holders'
job freedom. They may compete with domestic workers for jobs. Still,
the rights of domestic workers to strike for better wages and working
conditions, and to protest alleged unfair labor practices, deserve protection. This provision prohibits temporary workers, whose desire to
earn relatively high United States wages during their twelve months
of eligiblity may encourage them to take any job, from seeking employment in jobs vacant because of labor disputes.
SECTION 6: ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
(a) Aliens who have worked a total of sixty months in the United
States will be eligible, upon application, for adjustment of status
to permanent resident alien. Application for a refund of tax
money in accordance with the provisions of section 8 does not
preclude later application for adjustment of status.
(b) Once status has been adjusted in accordance with (a), these aliens
shall have all rights accorded to any permanent resident aliens.
Visa numbers for such aliens shall count against the total number
for the sending country in the year in which any alien receives
such adjustment of status.

Comment
This provision offers a legal alternative to those persons who desire
to immigrate, thereby lessening the pressure on those aliens to overstay
their temporary work visa period. It also provides an immigration opportunity to aliens with limited skills and no family ties in the United
States.
SECTION 7: RETURN OF TEMPORARY VISAS
PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF NEW VISAS
The total number of visas available to any country in any year will
be decreased by the number of expired temporary work visas issued
to citizens of that country which have not been returned to the Immigration and Naturalization Service or a United States consular office.
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Comment
This provision enlists the interests of the sending countries in encouraging their citizens holding temporary work visas to comply with
visa time limits. This provision also imposes a ceiling on the total number
of temporary workers from any one country. The total number of
workers with valid and expired visas will be equal to or smaller than
the number of visas allocated to that country.
SECTION 8: PENALTIES FOR VISA ABUSE
(a) Any worker found guilty of overstaying his or her temporary
work visa will not be eligible for adjustment of status to permanent resident alien, receipt of an immigrant visa, or receipt of
another temporary work visa.
(b) The Attorney General shall develop and implement a system for
documenting the entry and exit of aliens holding temporary work
visas.
(c) The Attorney General shall have the power to waive this penalty
in the event that circumstances warrant, in accordance with regulations the Attorney General shall develop under AP A rule making procedures.

Comment
This section requires the implementation of a comprehensive system
to document the entry and exit of aliens under temporary work visas.
Modern information processing capabilities should enable the Attorney
General to develop and implement such a system.
The Attorney General holds the discretionary authority to waive the
restriction of this section in individual cases. This provision expressly
grants this authority to enable the Attorney General to modify the potentially harsh effects of this section of the statute.
SECTION 9: DEPENDENTS EXCLUDED
Aliens may not bring or send for spouses or dependents during their
stay on a temporary work visa.

Comment
Because the temporary work visa holder remains in the United States
for a relatively short period of time, the hardships involved in separation from family members are of similarly short duration. This provi-
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sion also encourages the visa holder to return home at the end of the
visa period. Finally, this provision limits costs that local and state
governments might incur as a result of the temporary worker program.
SECTION 10: TAXES AND OTHER PAYMENTS
(a) Employers of aliens holding temporary work visas shall be responsible for normal payments and withholdings required for worker's
compensation; social security; and federal, state, and local income taxes.
(b) Aliens shall file federal income tax returns. The consular office
shall so inform workers when they apply for a temporary worker
visa and shall provide assistance in the filing of such tax returns.
The Internal Revenue Service shall assist temporary visa holders
in the filing of United States tax returns.
(c) Aliens earning income in the United States in any tax year under
a temporary work visa who file a federal income tax return for
that year will receive a tax refund from the federal government.
The Attorney General shall yearly establish the amount of the
refund in consultation with the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development and the Secretary of Education. This refund shall
cover the costs of services for which the temporary worker visa
holder is not eligible while in the United States.
(d) Temporary work visa holders may, upon return to their home
country and surrender of their visa, secure their contributions
to the social security system. Temporary visa holders who elect
not to remove their contributions may participate in the United
States social security retirement system.

Comment
This section eliminates the bonus accorded employers of H-2 workers,
raising the cost to employers of hiring aliens holding temporary work
visas to the level of the costs for hiring other workers. This section
thus equalizes the rights of foreign and domestic workers to retirement and worker's compensation.
Aliens on temporary work visas are excluded from access to some
public services, such as unemployment compensation and education
for their children. To balance this limitation on worker rights, the federal
government will reimburse all aliens working in the United States under
a temporary work visa. The amount of this refund will be determined
by the Attorney General, in cooperation with the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Education. The
Attorney General will consider, among other factors, the average school
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tax rate in the United States, and the cost of governmental services
for which temporary work visa holders are not eligible, such as welfare
and unemployment compensation.
SECTION 11: JUDICIAL REVIEW
Decisions about the status of temporary work visa holders and adjustment of status are reviewable. Review may occur in the federal district
court for the region where (1) the decision ·appealed from occurred,
(2) the alien is employed or resides, or (3) the District of Columbia.

Comment
This provision for judicial review of immigration decisions is consistent with, and is not intended to expand, current provisions in the
Immigration and Nationality Act.

Marjorie E. Powell

